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INTRODUCTION
The question of how, if at all, trade relations should be conditioned
upon or even tied to the international imposition of labor standards has
been a major source of conflict within the trading community for many
years, but has risen to particular prominence during the last decade.'
Arguments raised in these disputes have varied from substantive
discussions about the economic desirability of such linkage 2 to more
* JD, University of Michigan, 2004; Peggy Browning Fund Fellow, 2002; Researcher,
European University Institute, Fall 2003; Graduate Student in Philosophy, University of
Virginia, 1998-present; President's Fellow, University of Virginia, 1998-2001; Adjunct
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Military Institute, Spring 2001. Thanks to
Professor Christopher McCrudden and Professor Robert Howse, out of whose classes this
Note developed, and to the editors who worked on it.
1. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regional-
ism: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002)
(discussing the connection between President Clinton's linkage of trade and labor, and Clinton's loss
of "fast-track" authorization); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and
Societal Values, 22 U PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001); John Burgess & Rene Sanchez, Clinton's
Remarks on Sanctions Open Rift, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1999, at A30; Nancy Cleeland, Labor Lead-
ers Want Worker Safeguards Built Into Trade Accords, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at A19; Steven
Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 1999, at Al; Steve Pearlstein, Trade Theory Collides with Angry Reality, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
1999, at Al; Pradeep S. Mehta et. al., Third World Intellectuals and NGO's Statement Against Link-
age, at http://www.cuts-india.org/7win-sal.htm (last modified Nov. 15, 1999).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE 441-63 (2d ed. 1999); Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor Legitimacy, 91
CAL. L. REv. 885 (2003); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 126 (2002); International Monetary Fund, Debt Relief Globalization, and IMF Re-
form: Some Questions and Answers (Apr. 12, 2000), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/
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impassioned disputes involving accusations of "protectionism" and
"exploitation."3
While it remains unclear whether any genuinely enforceable global
labor standards will be set in the near future,4 one approach adopted by
the European Communities ("EC"), in which tariff discounts are granted
to those developing countries whose labor regulations conform to certain
standards, has generated much optimism. These discounts are offered as
part of the European Communities' Generalized Scheme of Preferences
("GSP"), one of many such programs set up by developed countries in
the early 1970's to assist industries in developing countries, through
preferential access to the developed country's market. However, on De-
cember 9, 2002, India requested that a World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute resolution panel be formed to evaluate the EC's GSP,
claiming that the scheme is inconsistent with the EC's obligations under
the WTO charter.5
This Note offers an introduction to the history of the GSP system,
and critiques India's claim that the particular GSP scheme enacted by the
EC is unacceptable under WTO law. It ultimately concludes that while
the EC's GSP scheme does indeed raise issues not raised by the GSP
scheme of any other country, it is nonetheless not inconsistent with the
EC's WTO obligations. Part 2 discusses the development of the interna-
tional GSP regime, as incorporated into the legal structure of the WTO,
and thereby establishes what originally was and was not seen as permis-
2000/041200b.htm (noting the IMF's statement that it "fully supports" the promotion of the
International Labor Organization's "Core Labor Standards").
3. See, e.g., T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM 71-80 (1998); World Trade Organization, Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the
World Trade Organization?: Criticism, Yes ... Misinformation, No!, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min99_e/english/misinfe/031abe.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2003)
(noting that some developing countries see calls for inclusion of labor standards in the WTO
rules as a "guise for protectionism in developed-country markets").
4. Distinguishing here the International Labor Organization "standards", which are
binding only upon those countries that have signed the relevant convention, and are backed by
no enforcement power. See Jill Borak, A Wink and a Nod: The Hoffman Case and its Effect on
Freedom of Association for Undocumented Workers, 10 HuM. RTS. 20, 23 (2003) ("the ILO
has no enforcement powers. In past complaints before the ILO the United States took no ac-
tion to implement the organization's recommendations"); see also Hans W. Baade, The
Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 429, 446 (1995) (ILO standards "fail to
lay down specific, directly enforceable legal obligations, but rather limit themselves to setting
forth standards of conduct deemed desirable by the respective international organizations and
their member states").
5. European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to De-
veloping Countries, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, VVTO Doc.
WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9, 2002). A panel was formed on March 6, 2003. WTO Secretariat, Note
on European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of India, WTO Doc.
WT/DS246/5 (Mar. 6, 2003).
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sible within such schemes. Part 3 then details the specifics of the EC's
GSP, particularly those parts that have given rise to the current dispute
with India. Finally, Part 4 analyzes the legal arguments at the center of
the dispute over the EC's GSP scheme, and explains why such a scheme
should ultimately be held to be WTO-consistent.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GSP
Although the current international trading system for a long time has
operated largely free from constraint by social concerns, various coun-
tries have at one time or another pushed the idea that trade should be
viewed as merely one consideration among others, rather than an end in
itself.6 Indeed, the birth of the current system was originally only a tem-
porary measure introduced after the failure of the Havana Charter, a
comprehensive trade/social agreement that was negotiated after World
War H.7 The United States' refusal to ratify the Charter made it worthless
as the basis for an international system, as it could not operate effec-
tively without the participation of one of the largest economies in the
world.8 Nonetheless, the countries involved agreed that rather than lose
all the benefits of the agreement, the trade component of the Charter
should remain in place until another comprehensive trade/social agree-
ment could be negotiated.9 Thus was born the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the foundation of the WTO.'0 Of course, the
desired comprehensive trade/social agreement was never achieved, and
6. Including the United States, which attempted to attach labor conditionality to its
trade agreements under the Eisenhower administration. Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair
Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1432-37
(2001). For more theoretical discussions of this question see Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Ine-
quality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 975 (2000); Ethan
B. Kapstein, Distributive Justice and International Trade, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 175
(1999).
7. HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf.2/78 (1948). See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT.: From the Havana
Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (1995); Anne 0.
Krueger, Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist?, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 105, 105-06 (1999).
8. See Demaret, supra note 7, at 127 ("Due to the United States' failure to ratify the
Havana Charter, the Charter never entered into force, and the General Agreement, by force of
circumstances, remained in force.").
9. Scott Daniel McBride, Reformulating Executive and Legislative Relationships after
Reformulated Gasoline: What's Best for Trade and the Environment?, 23 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV. 299, 303 (1998).
10. General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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the GATT simply continued as an independent agreement, severed from
all concerns other than promoting trade.'
The cornerstone of GATT is the principle of non-discrimination
("MFN"), 2 according to which no country can give the products of one
Member country better treatment than it gives to those of any other
Member. This means, for example, that England cannot attempt to bene-
fit a former colony by giving its products special tariff discounts.
However, it also means that developed countries cannot give special dis-
counts to developing countries to help them cultivate domestic
industries. Consistent with the historical excision of social concerns
from the GATT, the MFN principle rejects all "discrimination" outright,
disregarding any justification offered for differential treatment.'3
Despite the fundamental place of the MFN principle within the
GATT, discrimination has never been completely excluded from the sys-
tem. Even at the time of the initial adoption of the agreement, countries
with preferential trading agreements already in place were allowed to
continue them, though special exemptions from the MFN principle had
to be arranged. 4 Moreover, Article XXIV of GATT permits "preferential
trading arrangements", or free trade zones, between countries.' None-
theless, apart from such special exceptions necessary to gain the
accession of major developed countries, non-discrimination was agreed
upon as the basis for the trading system.
This was a particular source of contention for those developing
countries participating in the original negotiations for GATT. They ar-
gued strongly that unequal countries should not be treated equally, and
11. Id. It should be noted that there is some consideration given to non-economic con-
cerns in Article XX of GATT. GAIT, supra note 10, art. XX. Indeed, at least one author has
specifically argued that Article XX of GATT can itself act as a legal foundation for imposing
labor rights conditionality upon imports. ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION (2000), available at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/
wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2003).
12. The abbreviation stands for Most Favored Nation, the name given to the non-
discrimination principle. It is in Article I of GAIr, reflecting its importance to the subsequent
agreement. GATT, supra note 10, art. I. Most Favored Nation clauses had actually become
popular even before GATT, as a way of avoiding difficulties created by the need to negotiate
numerous bilateral tariff agreements. Krueger, supra note 7, at 105. See also Lothar Ehring,
De Facto Discrimination in WTO Law: National and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment-Or
Equal Treatment?, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 12/01 (2001), available at http://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/0 1/0 13201 .html (last visited Aug. 13, 2003).
13. Teresa Edwards, The Relocation of Production and Effects on the Global Commu-
nity, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 183, 201 (2002).
14. ROLF J. LANGHAMMER & ANDRE SAPIR, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GENERALIZED TAR-
IFF PREFERENCES 2 (1987). This has special relevance to the current case, as these were
agreements often designed to help developing former colonies. Id.
15. GATT, supra note 10, art. XXIV.
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that developing countries should be given special preferences within the
agreement to compensate for their inferior economic capacity.' 6 How-
ever, developed countries, particularly the United States, insisted that
developing countries would actually benefit most by taking part in a sys-
tem of free trade, and that special benefits would merely retard their
development. 7 Moreover, the developed countries saw the problems of
developing countries as similar to those faced by European countries
after the war, and believed that if free trade would help the European
countries recover, then it should do the same for developing countries.'8
Although failing in their general demand for preferential treatment
under GATT, the developing countries did succeed in some respects,
such as the acceptance of Article XVIII of GATT, which allows develop-
ing countries to deviate temporarily from GATF standards.' 9 Still, they
had been seriously hurt by the failure of the Havana Charter, which had
included far more extensive benefits for them, and they viewed the non-
discrimination approach of the GAFF7 as itself discrimination by devel-
oped countries against developing countries. Consequently, they played
little part in the subsequent unfolding of the trading system for over a
decade.°
As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that the GATT was initially
administered in a way overwhelmingly beneficial to the developed coun-
tries, confirming the belief of the developing countries that the GAT
was really just an institution designed to fulfill the needs of developed
nations, often to the detriment of the developing ones.2 ' Various attempts
to set up an organization with the more general responsibilities of the
Havana Charter ultimately all failed.22
By the late 1950's, however, the developing countries began to get
more involved in the international trading system, due to a combination
of their own increased political stability and a change in attitude about
16. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 6-7.
17. See DELSIE M. GANDIA, THE EEC's GENERALISED SCHEME OF PREFERENCES AND
THE YAOUNDE AND OTHER AGREEMENTS: BENEFITS IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT FOR LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 33 (1981).
18. See id.
19. GATT Article XVIII(4)(a) states:
Consequently, a contracting party, the economy of which can only support low
standards of living and is in the early stages of development, shall be free to deviate
temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement, as provided
in Sections A, B and C of this Article.
GATT, supra note 10, art. XVIII(4)(a).
20. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 3.
21. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 34.
22. These attempts came at the instigation of the USSR and developing countries them-
selves. Id.
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the benefits of free trade.23 They had generally converted to the free trade
agenda consistently pushed by the developed countries, but still objected
that the trading system as it actually existed was primarily designed to
benefit developed countries, and was not truly aimed at achieving genu-
ine equality. 24 Since they were now a part of the trading system, though,
and no longer simply objecting from outside, their complaints began to
receive more serious attention, until finally, in 1958, GATT formed an
expert committee of economists to investigate their claims.25
The Haberler Report 26 concluded that developing countries were
indeed lagging in trade growth, and that at least part of the cause of this
lag was discriminatory policies within developed countries. In response
to this report, the GATT contracting parties established another
committee to investigate whether the developed countries were indeed
responsible for the retarded growth of the developing countries. When
this committee also answered in the affirmative, the GATT contracting
parties finally agreed to deal with the problem, even in cases in which
the policies in question were not strictly GATT-inconsistent. The
developing countries thus had their first major success in forcing the
international trading system to take account of their views, although the
concessions given by the developed countries still only extended to
23. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 67, 70-71 (1992).
24. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 5.
25. The panel consisted of Haberler (chair), Meade, Tinbergen and Campos. Third
World Network, History and Evolution of the Trading System, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/
title/undp2.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2002).
26. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
REPORT BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS (1958). For a discussion of this report, see Craig N. Murphy,
What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New
International Economic Order Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 261, 266
(Paul F Diehl ed., 2d ed. 2001).
27. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 4.
28. History and Evolution of the Trading System, supra note 25.
29. The established committee found
[T]hat high tariffs faced the exports of developing countries over a wide range of
products-vegetable oils, coffee, tea, cocoa, jute products, cotton products, leather
goods and a variety of sophisticated manufactured products. The report also re-
vealed that in addition, these exports faced domestic taxes and levies that in fact
restrained consumption. Since there were no 'equivalent' domestic products, the in-
ternal taxes were not seen as a violation of GATT, and yet they came in the way of
demand and hence imports.
[Vol. 25:179
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removing trade barriers, and did not encompass the positive trade
assistance that developing countries had long sought.3°
The developing countries took their next major step in 1962, when
what would eventually become the "Group of 77"'3 held its first confer-
ence, on the Problems of Developing Countries.32 The Declaration issued
after this conference was presented at the next UN General Assembly,
and called for the holding of an international economic conference on
trade and development in the near future. When the same idea was again
presented at the 1962 Session of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC),33 it was agreed that ECOSOC would indeed convene a Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).34 The first UNCTAD
conference was subsequently scheduled for March 23 to June 16, 1964.'5
Not content merely to wait for the UNCTAD conference, however,
developing countries continued to push their agenda at the 1963 GATT
ministerial meeting. 36 As a result of this pressure, the Contracting Parties
endorsed, with reservations, an action program under which developed
countries would remove those trade barriers that handicapped developing
countries.37 They also proposed that GAT itself should be altered to
30. Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the
Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (1995); ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 44-45 (1987).
31. The Group of 77 describes itself in the following way: "As the largest Third World
coalition in the United Nations, the Group of 77 provides the means for the developing world
to articulate and promote its collective economic interests and enhance its joint negotiating
capacity on all major international economic issues in the United Nations system, and promote
economic and technical cooperation among developing countries." Group of Seventy-Seven at
the United Nations, at http://www.g77.org/main/main.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). Al-
though the Group of 77 continues to exist and remains active, one commentator has noted that
"over the years, the differences between developing countries (large/small, middle in-
come/least developed, industrialised/commodity exports, agricultural importers/exporters, and
others) have grown, to the point that in the Uruguay round a grand coalition of all developing
countries does not exist in any active sense." John Whalley, Non-Discriminatory Discrimina-
tion: Special and Differential Treatment Under the GATT for Developing Countries, 100
EcoN. J. 1318, 1318 (1990).
32. Thirty-six developing countries attended. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 35.
33. "ECOSOC is responsible for promoting higher standards of living, full employ-
ment, and economic and social progress; identifying solutions to international economic,
social and health problems; facilitating international cultural and educational cooperation; and
encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." United Nations
Economic and Social Council Website, at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/
about.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
34. The major trading nations initially opposed UNCTAD when it was first proposed in
1962, but even then suggested that they could change their minds. GANDIA, supra note 17, at
35.
35. Id.
36. D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GAiT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The
Tokyo Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 53 (1983).
37. The U.S. and Europe were divided over this idea, as the U.S. was insistent on non-
discrimination, while Europe had no objection, since the European countries already had a
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facilitate the trade of developing countries." Finally, Belgium and the
United Kingdom both proposed early attempts at a system of tariff
preferences for all developing countries.39
None of these proposals ultimately succeeded. The Belgian and
United Kingdom plans were simply rejected, and the proposed action
program, though endorsed, was never officially adopted.40 The one ap-
parent success was the most ambitious proposal: changing the very
structure of GATT itself. Incorporated into GATT two years later, Part
IV encourages developed countries to give special consideration to de-
veloping countries, and suggests that developed countries should not ask
for reciprocity from developed countries in the granting of preferences•.
However, because Part IV was only aspirational, and hence not binding
in its commitments, it ultimately had little real effect.42
Many developed countries were convinced that the combination of
adding Part IV to the GATT and the tariff reductions expected in the up-
coming Kennedy Round of negotiations would satisfy developing
• 41
countries. Yet, developing countries continued their efforts to change
the international trading system, particularly the MFN principle."
Finally, in 1964, the first UNCTAD conference took place, with 120
countries taking part.4 ' Each country had one vote, and there were no
system of trade preferences with their former African colonies. The U.S., however, objected to
the EC's preference schemes because of their reciprocal nature, which meant that African
countries had to give reciprocal tariff preferences to European products, giving them an advan-
tage over American ones. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 5-6.
38. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 36.
39. The Brasseur plan called for enormous bilateral negotiations in which developed
and developing countries would negotiate tariff preferences product by product. The prefer-
ences would then be tailored to the level of development of each country, each country's
capacity in the product in question, etc. It also did not exclude requiring reciprocal preferences
from recipient developing countries. The U.K. also proposed to extend the preferences it al-
ready gave to Commonwealth countries to all less developed countries if other countries did
the same. It has been suggested that these plans were proposed purely for political capital,
with full awareness that they would never be approved by the United States. GANDIA, supra
note 17, at 36.
40. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 6.
41. GATr, supra note 10, Part IV.
42. "Little of substance resulted directly from these three initiatives.... Part IV was
mostly rhetoric." LANGHAMMER & SAPlI, supra note 14, at 6.
43. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 38; LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 6-7.
44. Although, as described, developing countries can be seen as working as a group,
this is not, of course, to ignore the differences that still existed. Indeed, the strongest push for
GSPs actually came from the Latin American countries, who felt particularly disadvantaged
by the fact that most African, Asian and Caribbean countries already enjoyed preferential
arrangements with specific developed countries. The Latin American countries only agreed to
support a generalized preferential system on the condition that these other preferential
schemes be dismantled. David Wall, Problems with Preferences, 47 INT'L AFF. 87, 88 (1971).
45. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 37. This, of course, was not actually part of GATT, but
the result of a 1962 resolution by the UN's General Assembly. After the conference,
[Vol. 25:179
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vetoes, which meant that the developing countries could, from sheer
numbers, guarantee passage of any resolution they supported.46 However,
the resolutions would be non-binding, and have no real effect unless the
powerful developed countries endorsed them. Sometimes developing
countries passed a resolution over the dissent of the developed countries,
knowing that no practical steps would be taken immediately.47 The pro-
posal of the GSP was such a resolution. It was not passed by consensus,
and so not instituted by UNCTAD, but majority voting led to passage of
the principles supporting it, and formation of committees for further
study.48
The proposal for a GSP took center stage at the UNCTAD confer-
ence not just because of the wishes of participating developing countries,
but also because it was highlighted by the intellectual centerpiece of the
conference, a presentation by Argentinian economist Raul Prebisch. 9
Prebisch, who later became UNCTAD's first Secretary-General, 0 had
been in charge of preparations for the conference and delivered a speech
titled "Towards a New Trade Policy for Development,' "" now better
known simply as the Prebisch Report. Although his primary procedural
purpose was to outline the main issues to be discussed at the Conference,
Prebisch also used it to propose a comprehensive program of his own.
Most notably, his program called for a complete change from the usual
GATT policy of simply removing obstacles to the trade of developing
52
countries, proposing instead that positive assistance be given. 3
Among other things, the Prebisch Report proposed that developed
countries should grant temporary preferences to the manufactured and
semi-manufactured exports of developing countries.4 Prebisch suggested
a 10-year duty-free period for each manufactured or semi-manufactured
export from the time a country began exporting it, that the tariff on some
discussions continued in the Trade and Development board, the continuing UNCTAD body.
For more on this conference, see A.S. FRIEDEBERG, THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT OF 1964 (1969).
46. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 37.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 35; Wall, supra note 44, at 89.
49. Raul Prebisch, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: Report by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf.46/3 (1964). For a general discussion of Prebisch's ideas, see Gamani Corea, 11th
Lecture, 2001: Tribute to Raul Prebisch 6-12 (2001), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/prebisch I Ith.en.pdf (last visited May 7, 2003).
50. Prebisch was also an observer for the UN at the first meeting of the Group of 77.
GANDIA, supra note 17, at 35.
51. Id. at36.
52. This being also the policy pursued under the Havana agreements. LANGHAMMER &
SAPIR, supra note 14, at 7.
53. Prebisch, supra note 49, Part II.
54. Prebisch, supra note 49, at 65-72.
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products be reduced to zero immediately, and that the tariff on others
drop immediately by at least 50% and then be gradually phased out
within 5 years.55 Other existing preferences would be abolished immedi-
ately without compensation, but some special measures would be
introduced for the least developed countries.56
The emphasis on manufactured exports in Prebisch's plan is impor-
tant to note. Prebisch's proposal was a temporary program to help
developed countries create successful industries, and was not meant to
be a source of continual support.57 Prebisch believed that tariff prefer-
ences were necessary to protect infant industries in developing
countries:58 domestic markets in developing countries were too small to
support the establishment of industries on a cost-effective scale, making
access to the larger developed country markets necessary for their suc-
cess.59 However, once the 10-year period of beneficial tariff treatment
allowed these industries to establish a foreign market, tariffs could be
normalized again and the developing country industries would then
compete successfully on a level playing field with the industries of de-
veloped countries.' °
Of course, most developed countries, and particularly the United
States, opposed Prebisch's proposal, reiterating the traditional GATT
stance that the removal of trade barriers was the proper approach to im-
proving the trade of developing countries.6 They also objected that there
was no empirical evidence that Prebisch's plan would work, and that the
real problem was the developing countries' own policies.62 Moreover,
even those developed countries not opposed to Prebisch's plan insisted
55. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 37.
56. Id.
57. Prebisch stated "[e]xtemal cooperation is important, but only as a means of sup-
plementing and stimulating internal action, not as a substitute for it." Michael Cornell Dypski,
The Caribbean Basin Initiative: An Examination of Structural Dependency, Good Neighbor
Relations, and American Investment, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 95, 98 n.17 (2002).
58. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 8.
59. Id. Prebisch's academic work also emphasized the thesis that whereas the benefits
of technical progress in developed countries is retained in those countries through higher in-
comes, similar benefits generated in developing countries are transferred overseas through
lower prices. See generally RAUL PREBISCH, TOWARDS A DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR
LATIN AMERICA (1963); RAUL PREBISCH, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA
AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950); Raul Prebisch, Commercial Policy in the Underdevel-
oped Countries, 49 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 251 (1959). For a critical discussion of
this idea, see Andrea Maneschi, The Prebisch-Singer Thesis and the 'Widening Gap' Between
Developed and Developing Countries, 16 CANADIAN J. EcON. 104 (1983). For an outline of
Prebisch's later views, see Raul Prebisch, Raul Prebisch on Latin American Development, 7
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 563 (1981).
60. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 8-9.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 9.
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that other developed countries, including the United States, participate in
the plan, if implemented.63 This was a substantial barrier, given the
United States' open opposition to any plan of tariff preferences.
Consequently, even though the developing countries at UNCTAD
unanimously supported a GSP and agreed on a joint recommendation,
this recommendation finally had to be withdrawn after the outright rejec-
tion of tariff preferences by the United States.6 Ultimately all the
developed countries participating in UNCTAD either voted against the
resolution endorsing the Prebisch plan of preferences or abstained.65
But the discussion of a GSP at UNCTAD did lead to one immediate
minor success. Noting that its economic structure prevented it from
granting preferences on the scale proposed by Prebisch, Australia none-
theless offered to institute its own GSP scheme.66 Australia applied for
and received a waiver of the MFN principle in 1966, making it the first
country in the world to institute a GSP scheme.6'
Moreover, the European Economic Community ("EEC") also re-
sponded positively to the developing countries. By 1966, a large number
of developing countries either had formed preferential trade agreements
with the EEC, or had approached it with the intent of doing so. 6 Al-
though not the generalized system proposed by Prebisch, these bilateral
agreements served the same purpose for those countries able to negotiate
them. In December 1966, the EEC Commission recommended to the
Council of Ministers that a GSP be implemented.69
Perhaps the most important effect of the EEC's willingness to make
tariff agreements was its insistence that those agreements be reciprocal,
meaning that developing countries receiving the preferences also had to
give tariff discounts to European products.' ° Although designed to reduce
63. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 36.
64. The countries of Western Europe broadly supported preferences, but differed on
how to handle existing preferential agreements, with the British favoring across the board
preferences, while the EC favored a selective approach with safeguards for their former Afri-
can colonies. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 9-10. Part of the U.S. opposition was
optimism about the Kennedy round of negotiations, after which it was thought that tariffs
would be so low that any preferences would be of negligible worth, particularly after taking
into account the cost of running the system. Moreover, the U.S. felt that allowing preferential
trade could create an undesirable precedent. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 37.
65. Not all developed countries were present at the conference. GANDIA, supra note 17,
at 37.
66. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 11.
67. Developing countries did, however, criticize the scheme for being too limited.
Products that were already competitive from developing countries were excluded from the
scheme, as were those which competed with local products, and those already receiving the
benefit of the British Commonwealth preference scheme. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 38.
68. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 39.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the benefits developing countries gained through the agreements, this
policy ultimately played a major role in the general global adoption of
non-reciprocal GSP schemes. The United States worried that the EEC was
gaining a competitive advantage through these agreements, which made
EEC products cheaper than comparable American products in certain de-
veloping countries.7' Consequently, within a year, at the Conference of
Latin American Presidents in Punta del Este,72 the U.S. announced that it
too would endorse a global GSP, but only a non-discriminatory and non-
reciprocal one.73
Building on this increased willingness to adopt a GSP, the Group of
77 met in Algiers before the 1968 UNCTAD II conference and produced
the Charter of Algiers, which included a request for the introduction of a
GSP.7 4 The developed countries also moved closer to embracing a GSP.
The Special Group on Trade with Developing Countries, at the OECD,
produced a report for presentation at UNCTAD II, which described in
general terms how an acceptable GSP could be implemented.75
Eventually, UNCTAD II made little progress toward the introduction
of a GSP. 76 Still, the conference allowed developing countries to further
delineate their position. They moved beyond Prebisch's original pro-
posal-that only manufactured and semi-manufactured items should be
covered-and instead insisted that tariff preferences should also be given
71. Id.
72. Latin American countries had been complaining at this conference about the EEC's
preferential relations with African countries. Id. at 40; LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14,
at 10; Wall, supra note 44, at 90.
73. "Non-discriminatory" means one that does not categorize a particular group of
beneficiary countries, as the EEC's agreements had been doing. GANDIA, supra note 17, at
39-40; LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 10. For a detailed discussion of the relation-
ship between the U.S.'s GSP and labor rights, see Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor
Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 199 (2001).
74. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 39.
75. Wall states:
The document was extremely vague, and in a fundamental sense reflected only the
fear of European countries that following the apparent change of attitude of the
U.S.A. Administration a generalised scheme of preferences had become a strong
candidate for implementation. As a result the document read like a list of hedging
positions of the potential donor countries, bringing to light those attitudes towards
the scheme which the European countries had left unspoken while the scheme
seemed to have been vetoed by the United States.
Wall, supra note 44, at 91. Moreover, different OECD countries wanted the GSP to take dif-
ferent forms. The U.S. wanted uniform, non-reciprocal preferences, and a single plan. France
and the U.K. particularly opposed this, as they both already had agreements with their former
colonies. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 39.
76. Indeed, according to one commentator, "an impasse was reached on almost every
feature of the proposed scheme." Wall, supra note 44, at 91.
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to primary commodities and agricultural products." The developed coun-
tries, of course, objected to this proposal, but they agreed that some form
of GSP was desirable,"8 and a resolution passed both embracing a GSP
and committing the participating countries to a specific timetable. 9 Sub-
sequently, a Special Committee on Preferences was established under
UNCTAD, which met annually until it dissolved in 1996.80
Despite the agreement to create some form of GSP, the lack of con-
sensus as to the GSP's precise nature created predictable problems.
Initial attempts to arrange a single GSP on an international level could
not draw consensus on the details. As a result, it was decided that each
willing nation should simply introduce its own GSP, even though this
would mean differing schemes being introduced at different times.8'
By 1969, almost all the members of the OECD had submitted their
individual GSP proposals to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD. 82 Al-
though the schemes would benefit any country claiming "developing"
status,83 every plan explicitly reserved the right to refuse preferences to
any given country.8 The existence of these reservations is an essential
77. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 40.
78. Id. See also LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 10.
79. Preferential or Free Entry of Exports of Manufactures and Semimanufactures of
Developing Countries to the Developed Countries, U.N. Conference on Trade & Development
(UNCTAD), 2d Sess., Vol. I, Annex, Agenda Item 11, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/97/Annexes
(1968).
80. Wall, supra note 44, at 92; GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SCHEME OF
GENERALISED TARIFF PREFERENCES 13, at http://europa.eu.int/comnm/development/body/
theme/spg.en.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2002). For an account of the less-than-cooperative
approach of the developed countries in this committee see Wall, supra note 44, at 92-94.
81. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 11.
82. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 40.
83. The U.N. states:
There is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "devel-
oping" countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan
in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zea-
land in Oceania and Europe are considered "developed" regions or areas. In
international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as
developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the
former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern
Europe and the former USSR countries in Europe are not included under either de-
veloped or developing regions.
U.N. Statistics Division, Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/49/Rev.4 (1999), at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/
m49regin.htm. See also Reiko R. Feaver, Comment, China's Copyright Law and the TRIPS
Agreement, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 431, 454 n.162 (1996) ("Unlike 'least developed,'
'developing' status has resisted definition.").
84. Initially, the EEC listed no exceptions, but stated nonetheless that it might add
some. The U.S. and the U.K. included an escape clause, allowing them to reduce or withdraw
preferences altogether. The EEC also insisted that the preference schemes they already had in
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point for understanding the political context of the current Indian com-
plaint, as the adoption of a GSP involved no contractual obligation on
the part of the developed country concerned, but was instead a free gift
that could be withdrawn at any time." Thus, the developed countries his-
torically have been given a free hand to manipulate their GSP programs
at any time and for any reason.86
The final step in the creation of the GSP system occurred in 1971,
when the GATT Contracting Parties voted a 10-year waiver from the
MFN clause,87 thereby allowing the institution of the proposed GSP
schemes. The next month, the EC introduced its GSP, and most OECD
countries followed soon thereafter." The US, however, delayed institu-
tion of its own scheme until five years later, when the EC replaced the
reciprocal preference schemes it was still operating for its former colo-
nies with non-reciprocal schemes.9°
Still, at this point, the GSP system was not actually part of the law of
GATT, but based upon a temporary exemption from that law. However,
when the stark distinction between developing and developed countries
persisted at the end of the original 10-year period, it was decided that the
tariff preferences needed to be continued.9' Instead of merely renewing
the short-term exemption, the GATT contracting parties decided to add
the GSP permanently into GAIT, and in 1979 enacted the "Enabling
Clause". 92 This provision officially allows differential treatment for de-
veloping countries, without any requirement of GATT-waiver. 93 However,
it also envisages that developing countries will gradually lose those pref-
erences as they develop, and so retains the vision of the GSP as only a
temporary helping hand.94
place benefiting their former colonies would continue, and their GSP system was designed to
ensure that these agreements weren't undermined. GANDIA, supra note 17, at 41-42.
85. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 11.
86. For example, the United States' scheme excluded all communist countries, regard-
less of their development needs. THE TRADE PARTNERSHIP, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM
OF PREFERENCES PROGRAM 4 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. GSP PROGRAM], at http://
www.tradepartnership.com/pdf/1 997gsp.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2002).
87. Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of June 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D.
(18th Supp.) at 25 (1972).
88. U.S. GSP PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 2.
89. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 11.
90. Id.
91. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 12.
92. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. U4903 (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
93. Id.
94. LANGHAMMER & SAPIR, supra note 14, at 12.
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II. THE EC's GSP SYSTEM
Adopted in 1994, the EC's most recent GSP scheme95 divides im-
ported products into two categories, sensitive and non-sensitive.96 The
distinction is designed to protect domestic producers of certain products
from excessively strong competition from GSP-benefiting developing
countries. 9 For a similar reason, the scheme also includes a "safeguard
clause," which allows accelerated reestablishment of normal tariffs if
GSP-based imports "cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to a
Community producer of like or directly competing products. '
Consistent with the emphasis in the Enabling Clause that developing
countries should only receive GSP preferences as long as they are neces-
sary, the EC's scheme includes a "graduation" mechanism. 99 This section
of the scheme also includes a "de minimis" clause, however, so that if
the GSP-covered exports of the country concerned within the sector in
question compose less than 2% of the entire GSP-covered imports into
the EC within that sector in the previous year, then the graduation
mechanism will not be applied to its products.t°°
Finally, the least developed countries are given additional benefits
through a special "everything but arms" clause, which allows completely
95. The EC adopts its GSP schemes for 10 years, although, as in the present case, al-
terations can be made during that period. UNCTAD TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECT ON
MARKET ACCESS, TRADE LAWS, AND PREFERENCES, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES:
HANDBOOK ON THE SCHEME OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Vii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
ITCD/Misc.25/Rev.2 (2002) [hereinafter EC GSP HANDBOOK], available at http:I/
www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev2_en.pdf.
96. Council Regulation 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 on Applying a Scheme of
Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, art.
7, 2001 O.J. (L 346) 1, 5-6 [hereinafter GSP Regulation]. Before 2001 there were four catego-
ries: "very sensitive" (15% tariff reduction), "sensitive" (30% tariff reduction), "semi-
sensitive" (65% tariff reduction) and "non-sensitive" (100% tariff reduction). EC GSP HAND-
BOOK, supra note 95, at xii.
97. "The sensitivity of products is determined by the situation of the sector manufactur-
ing the same products in the Community. Sensitive products are those of sectors which still
require a higher border protection, while non-sensitive products are those which can compete
with duty free imports from developing countries." User's Guide to the European Union's
Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences 5 (2003) [hereinafter EU User's Guide], at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/gsp/gspguide.htm (last visited May 7, 2003).
98. GSP Regulation, supra note 96, art. 12.
99. Id. art. 12, l(b). This means that that when a developing country is judged to be
competitive with respect to a particular product that single product is then excluded from GSP
preferences. There is also a more general "country graduation mechanism," by which an entire
country can be excluded from participation in the GSP once it reaches a certain level of devel-
opment. This occurs when the country has for three consecutive years both (1) been classified
by the World Bank as a high income country, and (2) had a "development index" of a certain
size, the formula for which is provided in Annex II of the EC's GSP regulation. Id. art. 3.
100. Id. art. 12, 11 (b).
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duty-free access to the EC for all products of such countries, except arms
and ammunition.' °'
The source of the current dispute with India, however, is the three
special "incentive" preferences that are included in the scheme: (1) spe-
cial arrangements supporting measures to combat drugs, (2) special
incentive arrangements for labor rights,0 2 and (3) special incentive ar-
rangements for environmental protection. 3 These "incentives" consist in
additional reductions to the already GSP-reduced tariff rate."'0 The
"drug" preferences are given to specific countries judged to be effec-
tively combating drug production and trafficking, while the labor and
environment incentives are given to countries that adhere to certain labor
and environmental standards.' °5 The incentives are substantial enough
that the tariff reduction for industrial products can double, and nearly
double for agricultural products.
When the EC's labor incentive was originally instituted, developing
countries had to demonstrate that they had adopted and applied in their
national legislation the substance of International Labor Organization
("ILO") Conventions 87 and 98 (the right to organize and to bargain
collectively)' °6 and 138 (minimum age for employment).' °7 Since 2001,
however, the incentives have been explicitly linked to the ILO's Core
Labor Standards ("CLS"):'°s the elimination of forced labour
(Conventions 29 and 105),' 9 freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98),"" elimination of
101. This access being phased in over time for fresh bananas, rice and sugar, which are
judged to be particularly sensitive areas. EU User's Guide, supra note 97, 4.
102. The U.S. GSP scheme also includes its own labor conditionality, implemented in
1984. GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3019 (1984). For a discussion
of the history of labor conditionality in the U.S. GSP, see Compa & Vogt, supra note 73.
103. GSP Regulation, supra note 96, arts. 14-25.
104. Id. art. 8, 10.
105. Id. art. 10, 14, 21.
106. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Or-
ganise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter Freedom of Association Convention];
Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bar-
gain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter Collective Bargaining
Convention].
107. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26,
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter Minimum Age Convention].
108. See generally International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Rights and Principles at Work, ILO Doc. CIT/1998/PR20A, available at http://
training.itcilo.it/ils/foa/library/declaration/decl en.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
109. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S.
55; Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
110. Freedom of Association Convention, supra note 106; Collective Bargaining Con-
vention, supra note 106.
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discrimination in employment (Conventions 100 and 111),"' and the
abolition of child labor (Conventions 138 and 182). "2 Developing
countries no longer need to have adopted the conventions, but must have
incorporated the substance of them into their laws."3 They must also be
able to demonstrate to the EC that the relevant laws are being effectively
applied. Moreover, to keep the "incentives," developing countries have to
certify that individual shipments, and not just an industry as a whole,
comply with the requirements.
When the EC receives a request from a developing country for these
"incentive" preferences, it publishes a notice in the Official Journal of
the European Communities, inviting parties to make comments and
submit information." 4 The authorities of the applying country are in-
volved throughout the evaluation process, but the EC reserves the right
to demand such things as spot inspections, to ensure that standards are
actually being met."5 It is estimated that a decision as to whether a de-
veloping country is entitled to receive these benefits should take less
than a year, but the requesting country can ask for a delay on the deci-
sion if it requires more time to adhere to the requirements."
6
The "incentives" are designed to be adaptable to the reality of a de-
veloping country as the applicant country can exclude certain sectors in
which the requirements are not fulfilled." 7 Moreover, acceptance or re-
jection by the EC is not an "all or nothing" matter, as the EC itself can
also exclude products from certain sectors in which the conditions are
not fulfilled, even if they were part of the application filed."8 Even the
Ill. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for
Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303; Convention concerning Discrimina-
tion in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
112. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 107; Convention concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999,
38 I.L.M. 1207.
113. GSP Regulation, supra note 96, art. 14.2.
114. Id. art. 16.1.
115. Id. art. 16.3.
116. The EU states:
The examination of a request should be completed within a year. After consultation
of the Generalised Preferences Committee, the Commission decides whether to
grant the benefit of the special incentive arrangements or not. However, where the
requesting country needs more time in order to conform to the requirements, it may
ask that the decision be postponed. The Commission may decide to exclude certain
sectors where, according to its findings, the conditions for granting the additional
preferences are not fulfilled.
EU User's Guide, supra note 97, 1 8:
117. Id.
118. Id.
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fact that a sector has been previously "graduated" will not exclude it
from receiving the additional "incentive" preferences." 9
The next section analyzes in detail the arguments at the center of the
dispute over labor conditionality in the EC's GSP, and explains why it is
not WTO-inconsistent.
III. THE INDIA/EC DISPUTE
On March 12, 2002, India requested consultations with the EC
20
about its GSP scheme, specifying their objection to the labor/
environment/drug preferences. Although there is evidence that India is
now only challenging the EC's "drug preference" and not its "labor
preferences,"'' the following discussion will address how a dispute
between India and the EC over the EC's "labor preferences" should be
resolved, as a way of explaining why such a scheme is indeed WTO
compliant.
First, it is important to note that India is not complaining about the
EC's GSP itself, but rather about the "incentives" that the EC has added
to its scheme.122 The argument suggested by India in its request for con-
sultations is that GSP preferences are only permitted under the Enabling
Clause "in order to increase the export earnings, to promote the industri-
alization and to accelerate the rates of economic growth of [developing]
countries.' 23 Since the "incentives" in the EC scheme are designed for
119. Id. 6.
120. "Consultations" are required prior to bringing a case at the WTO. Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 4, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1225, 1228-29 (1994).
121. European Communities--Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, Request for Consultations by India, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/I (Mar. 12,
2002) [hereinafter Request by India], Third party submissions in the case by the U.S. suggest
that India may have narrowed its argument, to solely challenge the drug preferences. See Third
Party Submission of the United States regarding European Communities--Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc. WT/DS246 (Apr. 30,
2003), available at http://www.wto.org. However, it is unclear whether the U.S. submissions
reflect a change in India's argument, or just the specific interests of the United States, as the
United States itself has a regional tariff "preference" scheme to help reward specified Latin
American countries engaged in the fight against drugs, the Andean Trade Preferences Act, 19
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2000). For details on this scheme, see First Report to the Congress on
the Operation of the Andean Trade Preference Act as Amended. THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FIRST REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF
THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE (2003) available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/
2003atpa.pdf.
122 Request by India, supra note 121.
123. This being the language used in the Preamble to the 1971 Decision that first intro-
duced the Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 87, pmbl.
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social purposes and not economic ones (India argues), they cannot be
justified by the Enabling Clause, and so are illegal under the MFN clause
of the WTO agreement.
To understand the rationale behind the case, it is important to iden-
tify where the burdens will lie. As the complaining party, India/Thailand
has the initial burden of showing that there is a prima facie case that the
EC's regulation violates WTO obligations. 24 The EC then bears the bur-
den of showing that it can nonetheless justify its regulation under WTO
standards.'25 However, as will be argued later, this does not preclude In-
dia from bearing the burden on a specific issue.
Given that the EC's tariff "incentives" clearly violate the MFN prin-
ciple, if they do not qualify under the Enabling Clause,1 6 India would
seem easily to be able to carry their burden of demonstrating that the
EC's "incentive" scheme is prima facie discriminatory, meaning that
now the presumption is in their favor. The EC has to show that its prefer-
ence system is consistent with the enabling clause, rather than merely
contending that India has not shown that it is not. As I will now argue,
the EC should be able to do that, and so India will ultimately fall in their
challenge. 1
27
A. The EC's Case
India seems able to make a very strong point that the incentives are
not being offered for economic reasons. The text of the Enabling Clause
and the original waiver emphasize that the goal of these preferences is to
benefit the trade of developing countries.' Hence, if offered for any
non-economic reason, incentives will not qualify under the Enabling
Clause waiver to MFN, and so will be illegal under WTO law.
The EC can respond to this argument in two ways. First, it can argue
that GSP preferences, in fact, do not need to be offered for economic
124. "The general rule is that the initial burden of proof rests with the claimant. This
holds true even when it requires the claimant to demonstrate the negative, such as raising a
presumption that there are no relevant studies or reports supporting another party's measures."
Andrew W. Shoyer & Eric M. Solovy, The Process and Procedure of Litigating at the World
Trade Organization: A Review of the Work of the Appellate Body, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
677, 689 (2000).
125. "Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of a breach of a covered agree-
ment, the burden shifts to the defendant to refute the claimed inconsistency." Id.
126. As the GSP tariff discounts are only offered to developing countries. As a result, the
GSP discriminates against developed countries.
127. However, for an argument that the VTO's legal structure should not concern itself
with labor standards in any situation, but avoid any direct consideration as a "political ques-
tion," see Guzman, supra note 2.
128. Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 87.
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reasons, but only have to have a desirable economic effect. 29 Second, it
can argue that their preferences are indeed being offered for economic
reasons, as adherence to the ILO's Core Labor Standards'30 helps eco-
nomic development.
That economic motives may not be required for a GSP scheme is
questionable. While the Enabling Clause does specifically justify the
allowance of tariff preferences by reference to the trade needs of
developing countries, it also states that they shall be "designed and, if
necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial
and trade needs of developing countries."'3 ' The inclusion of
"development" along with trade may provide some support for an
argument that the preferences need not be designed solely to benefit the
developing country recipient economically, as long as they do in fact
create such a benefit.' However, "development" can also be a purely
economic term, and the fact that the other two "needs" mentioned in the
sentence are themselves purely economic strongly suggests that this is the
reading that should be given to "development" as well. Moreover, as
illustrated above, historically the arguments for a GSP were consistently
economic. Given the ambiguity of the meaning of "development" and the
historical arguments for the GSP, it is at the very least unclear whether the
EC can carry its burden with this argument.
Nonetheless, there is still some support for this position in WTO
jurisprudence, through a parallel with the Appellate Body's reasoning in
the Shrimp/Turtle decision.'33 In Shrimp/Turtle, a central part of the
dispute was the meaning of "exhaustible natural resources" in GAT[
Article XX, which allowed measures to conserve such resources, even
though they would otherwise be GATT-inconsistent. '34 This provision
had historically referred to things such as oil and minerals,'35 but the US
attempted to argue that it applied to living creatures, specifically turtles,
as well.36 In interpreting the term in question, the Appellate Body
129. That is, that the motivation of the granting country is irrelevant, as the GSP waiver
is intended to allow economic assistance to be given to developing countries. To deny assis-
tance that would indeed benefit a developing country's economy merely because of the
motives of the granting country is inconsistent with that goal.
130. As is required by the EC's labor incentive.
131. Enabling Clause, supra note 92, T 3(c).
132. This latter qualifier being required by the fact that the sentence says "development,
financial and trade needs," rather than "development, financial or trade needs." Id.
133. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII 2755 (Oct. 12,
1998).
134. GATT, supra note 10, art. 20(g).
135. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENvTL L. 491, 502 (2002).
136. Id. at 501.
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appealed to the fact that the preamble to the WTO Agreement describes
"sustainable development" as a goal of the international trading system,
and held that the term should, therefore, be interpreted in the light of
contemporary conceptions of "sustainable development."'37  After
referring to numerous international agreements and resolutions, the
Appellate Body then held that despite the fact that "exhaustible natural
resources" had not covered living creatures when initially adopted,
evolving understandings of "sustainable development" as reflected in
international law had now extended the concept to the point where it
did.1
38
Likewise, the EC can argue that many international economic
agreements now include labor conditionality,3 9 showing that the interna-
tional community now acknowledges labor standards to be essential to
economic development. The WTO's own recent endorsement of "sus-
tainable development" further supports this argument,' 40 much as the Rio
Declaration on the Environment helped sway the Appellate Body in
U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle.1
4
'
India could claim that explicit statements made at the WTO Ministe-
rial Conference in Singapore in 1996-and implicitly endorsed in Doha in
2001-that "the ILO is the competent body to deal with [labor] stan-
dards," argue strongly against such an understanding of economic
development as applied to the GSP system. 4 Yet the Appellate Body's
137. Id. at 502.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United Mexican States, Sept. 13, 1993, Annex 1, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (endorsing labor standards
included in the ILO's Core Labor Standards and some others). For more examples, see
generally Peter Bakvis, Labour Standards and Development (2002), http://
wbInOO18.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/Pages/Paper+by+Bakvis/$File/BAKVIS+FINAL.PD
F (last visited Dec. 27, 2002).
140. WTO Ministerial Declaration, WTO Ministarial Conference, 4th Sess. (Doha),
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 6, (Nov. 9-14, 2001) ("We strongly reaffirm our com-
mitment to the objective of sustainable development ...."). Note, though, that the WTO's
discussions of "sustainable development have centered on environmental, not labor issues. See
generally, Mathieu Regnier, Trade and Sustainable Development at Doha (2001), at
http://oikosintemational.org/centers of-excellence/itas/Lidija.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
However, the notion of "sustainable development" is not restricted to an environmental con-
text. For example, the Sustainable Development Department of the Inter-American
Development Bank has a "Labor Markets" division. Sustainable Development Department,
Inter-American Development Bank Website, at http://www.iadb.org/sds/soc/sitel12-e.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
141. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 51/5/Rev. I (1992).
142. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 4, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 218, 221 (1997). However, Prof.
Howse criticizes this stance:
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apparent willingness to bring social concerns into the WTO 3, combined
with the negative publicity that would result if the EC regulations were
struck down, may lead to a holding for the EC.
Turning to the argument that the "incentives" are indeed being of-
fered for economic reasons, the EC's case is very strong, as there is now
a great deal of evidence indicating that adhering to the Core Labor Stan-
dards does indeed benefit an economy. For example, adherence to the
Core Labor Standards has been clearly linked to a reduction in income
inequality within a country." Arguably one restraint to the economies of
developing countries is that the workers are so lowly paid that they do
not have sufficient buying power, and so the economy is unable to
145grow.
Moreover, many recent studies have explicitly stated that adher-
ence to Core Labor Standards can contribute to economic growth.' 46 As
stated by one economist, "economic theory predicts, and empirical evi-
dence indicates, lax enforcement of workers' rights encourages
The ILO, which concerns itself with international labor rights, does not possess the
jurisdiction to determine whether trade sanctions undertaken by its members for la-
bor rights reasons are consistent with trade rules under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or other WTO treaties, much less to waive or override
such rules in the event of inconsistency. Indeed, according to the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, any determination concerning the violation of a WTO
agreement must be taken within the ambit of the WTO's own institutional frame-
work for settling disputes.
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 134 (1999). Moreover, the WTO's claim must also be
evaluated in the context of the fact that the ILO has already rejected a suggestion that it should
certify and label products from countries complying with the core labor standards. Christopher
McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L.
43,47 (2000).
143. This, at least, being one possible reading of the Shrimp/Turtle decision.
144. Bakvis, supra note 139, at 8-9.
145. This, notably, being one of Prebisch's own arguments. See supra note 59, and ac-
companying text.
146. See, e.g., World Bank, Core Labor Standards Toolkit, at http://
www.worldbank.org/cls (last visited Oct. 15, 2003); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A
STUDY OF CORE WORKER'S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996) (finding a positive
correlation between economic growth and respect of Core Labor Standards); J.E. Dolvik &
Liv Torres, Globalisation, Work, and Labour Standards (2002), at 43, http://odin.dep.no/
archive/udvedlegg/01/03/rapp9064.pdf ("there is a strong connection between economic
growth and improvement of labour standards"); David Kucera, The Effects of Core Workers'
Rights on Labour Costs and Foreign Direct Investment, International Institute for Labour
Studies Discussion Paper DP/130/2001 (2001), at 4, available at http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/bureau/inst/download/dpl300l.pdf ("survey results suggest that if stronger
worker rights are associated with higher labour costs-a negative for FDI [Foreign Direct
Investment]-but also with greater stability-a positive for FDI-the positive effects may
well offset the negative").
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prolonged reliance on less-skilled-labor-intensive activities and does
little to encourage economy-wide capital formation, the development of
more advanced industries, and long-term growth."'
4 7
The evidence seems weaker for free association than for the other
Core Labor Standards, arguably because whether free association is
beneficial depends upon the type of association that takes place, which
itself depends on many things. Werner Sengenberger, for instance, has
argued that a comparative study of the attitudes of labor unions to indus-
trial change, raises:
The general question of whether it is really excessive institution-
alization or over-regulation that are to blame when standards run
into apparent conflict with economic objectives; or whether, on
the contrary, it is rather the "under-development" of labour insti-
tutions-be it lack of participation, or lack of representation at
particular levels of organization-which is at the root of the
problem.
48
It also has been argued:
When workers can organize and bargain collectively, they will
be able to push for decent working conditions and for better
wages; they will be able to garner a larger share of the fruits of
globalization. This will lead to workers becoming owners of
other types of property and will help give incentives for workers
to invest more in their own skills and in the success of the com-
panies for which they work. It will help build a middle class. In
fact, the ability of workers to organize and bargain was instru-
mental in helping the United States develop a strong middle
class during and after the industrial revolution. 14
Hence, while free association itself may not correlate strongly with eco-
nomic growth, free association, properly handled, may.
Although the connection between high labor standards and eco-
nomic development is still highly contested, it seems clear that the
neither a panel nor the Appellate Body will demand unanimity among
economists favoring labor standards before any country can utilize the
147. PETER MORICI, LABOR STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 6 (2001).
148. Werner Sengenberger, Labour Standards: An Institutional Framework for Restruc-
turing and Development, in CREATING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: THE ROLE OF LABOUR
STANDARDS IN INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 3, 7 (Werner Sengerberger & Duncan Campbell
eds., 1994).
149. Rep. Sander M. Levin, Speech for the International Labor Standards Conference
(May 19, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/Levin/05.19.02.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2003).
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argument that standards promote economic development.'50 After all, it is
arguably even more highly contested whether a GSP program promotes
economic development, so a strong stance by the WTO's dispute resolu-
tion system would be completely unworkable as an approach to
analyzing GSP problems.' 5 ' The only reasonable approach, then, is for
the Appellate Body simply to require that a GSP-granting country be
able to provide solid evidence that its specific program in fact aids eco-
nomic development, in order to be able to qualify under the "economic"
conditionality of the GSP waiver.
Once it is accepted that the "incentives" are indeed inducing devel-
oping countries to adopt standards that will help their economic
development, the only problem for the EC's case is that it might seem
objectionable for a developed country to be using the GSP system as a
way of forcing its own values onto developing countries.' 52 After all,
while high labor standards may indeed contribute to economic growth,
they are clearly not the only way to get such growth. The WTO's dispute
resolution system might, then, be wary of endorsing such a use of the
GSP, particularly when, as shown above, such a use is antithetical to the
motivating intent behind the GSP system.
One defense of the EC on this point might be to note that India is it-
self a member of the ILO. Indeed, India was a founding member of the
ILO, and has been permanent member of its governing body since
1922.' 53 However, India did not withdraw when the ILO announced that
it regarded the Core Labor Standards as obligations to all members,
150. Such a conclusion is supported by the Appellate Body's comment on the kind of
scientific consensus required to justify reliance upon scientific evidence in the context of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:
Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only
the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. In some cases, the very
existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated
the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. Sometimes
the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which
may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible and repre-
sentative governments tend to base their legislative and administrative measures on
"mainstream" scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representa-
tive governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be
a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, DSR 1998:1 135, 194 (Feb. 13, 1998).
151. For a discussion of relevant economic studies of the effect of the GSP on develop-
ing country economies see Whalley, supra note 31, at 1323-24 (concluding that "[w]hen
combined with the seeming frailness of GSP schemes under graduation pressures, the overall
benefits to developing countries seem of limited consequence" [footnote omitted]).
152. See generally Srinivasan, supra note 3.
153. International Labour Organisation, Subregional Office for South Asia, at http://
www.ilo.org/public/englishlregionasro/newdelhi (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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whether they had signed the relevant conventions or not.'M This point is
unlikely to play a significant role in a WTO panel's reasoning, but may
help to reduce their concerns about over-riding the autonomy of a con-
tracting party by interpreting a GAT[ provision in an unconventional
way.
Finally, it should also be noted that the traditional objections of de-
veloping countries to the imposition of high labor standards cannot be
made in this case, as it is difficult to portray the GSP incentives as "pro-
tectionist."'' 5 Indeed, these "incentives" actually serve as a means by
which the EC can at least partially carry the cost of improving labor
standards in developing countries. Of course, the additional costs from
better labor regulations would be imposed even on those products not
sold to the EC, so some additional cost would be borne by India. How-
ever, since conforming to the EC's standards is voluntary, this is merely
a factor that India can consider, and is not directly a cost imposed on
them by the EC. Again, a WTO panel should not find this point signifi-
cant, but could alleviate some of their misgivings.
Ultimately, it seems clear that the strongest argument that the EC can
make for the WTO-consistency of its preferences is that they are indeed
being offered for economic reasons. It is certainly controversial amongst
economists whether high labor standards are economically beneficial,'56
but a WTO panel is very unlikely to demand that a nation conform its
policies to economic orthodoxy, even in the name of non-discrimination,
as long as there is some significant body of reputable economic opinion
that supports its actions.
B. India's Best Arguments
Even if the EC successfully argues that the "incentives" are being of-
fered in the name of economic development, India may argue that the
specific nature of the EC's program is unacceptable under the WTO.
This argument might generate sympathy, but ultimately will not be
strong enough to win the case.
154. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 18, 1998, art.
2, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1998).
155. For the general argument that labor standards are a protectionist move by developed
countries see Srinivasan, supra note 3. It should also be considered, however, that the GSP can
be used as leverage for protectionist purposes, even though it is not itself protectionist. Whal-
ley argues that "[tihe threat of graduation from GSP has, itself, been used on a number of
occasions by developed countries as a mechanism to force developing countries to make
changes requested by developed countries in other non-trade policy areas (such as intellectual
property)." Whalley, supra note 31, at 1322.
156. See, e.g., Richard Freeman, International Labor Standards and World Trade:
Friends or Foes?, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD (Jeffrey J. Schott
ed., 1997).
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India may reiterate the statement by the WTO Ministerial at
Singapore (1996) that "the ILO is the competent body to deal with
[labor] standards."'57  However, when properly understood, that
pronouncement simply does not apply to this particular case. By
allowing the labor incentives to remain part of the EC's GSP program,
the WTO would not itself be enforcing labor standards, any more than it
enforces the substantive aspects of trade policies generally. Rather, it
would be explicitly avoiding the issue, and leaving each State to
determine its own policy. To argue otherwise requires a premise that any
trade-related measure not precluded by the WTO is necessarily endorsed
by it. The WTO's statement at Singapore, then, can only be understood
as meaning that the WTO does not wish to become a global enforcer of
labor rights, not that Member States are forbidden from including labor
conditionality in their trade agreements.
A stronger argument for India is that the EC's regulations do not take
fair account of the nature of the labor markets in developing countries,
and hence cannot be designed to benefit developing economies. The
claim here is not that developing countries are unwilling to enforce
strong labor laws, but rather that they are unable to because of the large
amount of unofficial work in their countries.'58 Consequently, India may
argue, the EC's GSP system is clearly not a genuine attempt to help de-
veloping countries develop economically, since it allows a problem
inherent to developing countries to disqualify them from receiving its
benefits.
157. Bakvis, supra note 139, at 10.
158. For example, Mishra argues:
The&6 is a notion in the developing countries that labour standards improve only
when economies and job opportunities grow. Globalisation aims at improving our
growth rate and thereby improving labour standards, though not at the same rate. So
far this has not really happened. The condition of labour in the formal sector [in In-
dia] is reasonably good as they are covered by comprehensive labour laws. Here
wages are relatively high and working conditions relatively good. However, this
sector covers just about 8% of the workforce while it contributes nearly 40% of na-
tional output. The hard Indian reality is that the vast majority of the under-
privileged workers are found in the informal sector which covers almost 92% of the
workforce. The working conditions in the informal sectors are extremely bad and
the workers are nearly totally bypassed by labour laws. The incidence of child la-
bour is common in this sector. The labour in this sector finds it difficult to organise
because of the fear of being dismissed or antagonised by their employers. To be-
lieve that the kind of labour standards being invoked under the WTO aegis can be
applied to India's informal sector, at least to a large part of it is almost like living in
a dream.
Harindra Kishor Mishra, Impact of WTO on Indian Economy, in WTO AND THE INDIAN
ECONOMY 99, 106-07 (G.K. Chadha ed., 2001).
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Although there does seem to be a genuine problem pointed out by
this argument, its effectiveness as an objection to the EC's GSP program
is largely undercut by the fact that the EC's incentive scheme only re-
quires that the laws be "effectively applie[d]."'5 9 This requirement seems
flexible enough to require taking into account the facts of the specific
situation in question, and to allow that laws are "effectively applied"
when they have as great an effect as they can and there are no readily
available options that would do more. There is no clear requirement in
the EC's GSP Regulation that the problem be completely solved. This
leaves a WTO panel with the option of ruling that the EC's regulation
itself is acceptable, but that any given denial of the preferences can be
challenged by the developing country concerned if it can demonstrate
discriminatory application of the rule in its case.160
Finally, India may attempt to advance an MFN-based "moral"
argument to buttress its more strictly legal arguments. The MFN
requirement for GATT-consistent trade rules is that the regulation must
not be discriminatory amongst WTO member parties. The GSP systems,
of course, are themselves explicit exceptions to this provision. However,
India may argue that the way the EC grants preferences discriminates
between developed and developing countries by placing developing
countries in a secondary position in the trading system. That is, it is not
that particular countries are being discriminated against, but that
developing countries as a whole are being reduced to a secondary status
through a provision designed to benefit them.
It is unclear how strong this argument is, since developing countries
originally wanted the GSP, and it has long been accepted that GSP-
granting countries can stop giving preferences to specific developing
countries for any reason at all. The United States' GSP scheme, for ex-
ample, has included a labor conditionality provision for decades, and
countries have indeed lost their preferences for violation of fundamental
labor rights. 6' Thus, the way that GSP schemes have always been
adopted seems itself to place developing countries in the secondary posi-
tion that this objection attempts to build upon. Because a WTO panel is
159. GSP Regulation, supra note 96, art. 14.2.
160. This is the approach taken by the WTO Panel, United States-Sections 301-310 of
the Trade Act of 1974 WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R, DSR 2000:11 815 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter
U.S.-Sections 301-310].
161. HENRY J. FRUNDT, TRADE CONDITIONS AND LABOR RIGHTS: U.S. INITIATIVES,
DOMINICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA RESPONSES 9 (1998). This provision, however, is not an
"incentive" scheme as the EC is offering, and does not face exactly the same challenge. For a
generally positive review of the effect of the U.S.'s GSP labor conditionality on labor rights in
developing countries, see Compa & Vogt, supra note 73.
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not bound by past practice, 62 it may choose to ignore this fact but India's
argument will be substantially weakened.
C. The Outcome
The determinative factor in the resolution of this dispute, however, is
not one of the above arguments regarding WTO-consistency of the EC's
GSP. It is rather the reality of the approach WTO jurisprudence has taken
towards national regulatory schemes. Enormous deference is given to
national regulations, and a regulation will not be struck down as WTO-
inconsistent unless it is unavoidably inconsistent.' If it is at all possible
to operate the regulatory scheme in question in a way consistent with the
WTO, then it will be upheld, allowing only that any given application of
the regulation can be challenged for its WTO consistency. The diffi-
culty in challenging a national regulation is even greater than this might
suggest, however. It has been held that even if a regulation is textually
WTO-inconsistent, if the country concerned is willing to make represen-
tations at the hearing that it will not apply the regulation in a WTO-
inconsistent manner, the regulation will be upheld, despite its text. 165
162. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340. ("[S]ubsequent practice" is only relevant as part of the "context" of the
treaty). The Vienna Convention is relevant because the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
which controls the practice of WTO dispute resolution bodies, requires that agreements be
interpreted "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law"
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 3.2,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
163. The panel in United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and
Use of Tobacco stated:
Panels had consistently ruled that legislation which mandated action inconsistent
with the General Agreement could be challenged as such, whereas legislation which
merely gave the discretion to the executive authority of a contracting party to act
inconsistently with the General Agreement could not be challenged as such; only
the actual application of such legislation inconsistent with the General Agreement
could be subject to challenge.
WTO Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use
of Tobacco, Oct. 4, 1994, GATT B.I.S.D. (41st Supp., vol. 1) 131 at 174, 118 (1997).
164. Id.
165. In U.S.-Sections 301/310, the panel found:
[T]he statutory language of Section 304 constitutes a serious threat that determina-
tions contrary to Article 23.2(a) may be taken and, in the circumstances of this case,
is prima facie inconsistent with Article 23.2(a) read in the light of Article 23.1. We
then found, however, that this threat had been removed by the aggregate effect of
the SAA and the US statements before this Panel in a way that also removes the
prima facie inconsistency and fulfils the guarantees incumbent on the US under Ar-
ticle 23. In the analogy described in paragraph 7.65, the sign "No Trespassing.
Trespassers may be shot on sight" was construed by us as going against the mutual
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The problem this creates for India/Thailand is that if an incentive-
based scheme can be operated in a way functionally equivalent to a
traditional "give-and-take-away" scheme, then the EC can simply enter the
hearing and state that even if the incentive-based approach is
unacceptable, it will simply treat the regulation from now on as giving
preferences to all developing nations, but then removing them from those
who cannot demonstrate that they meet the required labor standards.
Consequently, since there is no functional distinction in this case between
give-and-take-away preferences and giving-as-an-incentive, India needs to
offer a reason why even the former approach would leave the EC's scheme
WTO-inconsistent.
India could argue that a give-and-take-away approach is unaccept-
able. The EC's approach allows creation of a scheme in which it accords
benefits to all developing countries, but then takes them away unless
they can meet requirements designed in such a way that only a single
country could meet - thus, getting around the non-discrimination basis
of the GSP.'66 Consequently, even a give-and-take-away scheme must be
subject to some scrutiny.
There does seem to be one way to draw a distinction between
acceptable and unacceptable give-and-take-away GSP schemes, as by the
demonstrated intent of the scheme. A scheme so finely tailored that only
a select few developing countries can qualify under it does not benefit
developing countries merely for being developing countries. It
capitalizes on this benefit available to developing countries in order to
give benefits for a completely different reason - this reason determined
by the developed country. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the language of the
Enabling Clause indicates that the preferences need to be given to
convey an economic benefit upon the developing country, and for no
other reason.67
promise made among the neighbours always and exclusively to have recourse to the
police and the courts of law in any case of alleged trespassing. Continuing with that
analogy, we would find in this case that the farmer has added to the original sign
which was erected for all to read another line stating: "In case of trespass by
neighbours, however, immediate recourse to the police and the courts of law will be
made". We would hold-as we did in this case-that with this addition the agree-
ment has been respected.
U.S.-Sections 301-310, supra note 160, at 1149, 7.131.
166. Keeping in mind that the discretion given to GSP-giving countries as to when they
can refuse to give preferences is large enough to have allowed the U.S. to refuse to give them
to communist countries, for a purely political motive. The U.S. Generalized System of Prefer-
ences Program, supra note 86, at 4.
167. Of course, it was acknowledged earlier that this reading of the text is open to some
dispute, but then this entire argument of incentive versus give-and-take-away only becomes
necessary if one accepts the "pure economic" reading, so presumes as its basis that any other
reading has already been rejected.
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A WTO panel evaluating such a case, then, could merely require that
the challenging country demonstrate that the GSP scheme in question is
indeed an attempt to illegitimately get around the WTO's constraints. If,
however, the panel determines that the intent behind the scheme is le-
gitimate, then the scheme should be held to be so as well, no matter how
restricted the beneficiaries ultimately are.
In the dispute at hand, then, the simple fact that the regulations con-
cerned are labor regulations is irrelevant, since, as argued above, it is not
implausible for a country to claim that higher labor standards will indeed
convey an economic benefit to a developing country. However, the pre-
cise labor standards at issue might be judged to be so unreasonably high
or so irrationally put together, or the procedures for applying for the
preferences so imposingly complex, that the scheme cannot plausibly be
taken to be a genuine attempt to convey an economic benefit. Rather, it
can only be seen to be an attempt to induce the developing country con-
cerned to change its social policies.
Unfortunately, the result of this analysis in the dispute at hand re-
quires far more facts than are currently available, so would have to
actually be left to a WTO dispute resolution panel. However, as things
stand currently there does not seem to be any reason to believe that the
EC's scheme is anything other than a genuine attempt to raise labor
standards in an economically plausible way.
Finally, of course, there remains the question of who should bear the
burden on the specific issue of the intent of the regulation. It may seem
that the EC should be required to demonstrate their own good intent
since, as discussed above, they will at this point have the burden of
showing that their regulation is WTO-consistent. However, there is a
suggestion in WTO case law that India will be expected to prove the
EC's wrongful intent. While confirming that a principle of good faith is
operative in WTO disputes, the Appellate Body has rejected "the conclu-
sion that simply because a WTO Member is found to have violated a
substantive treaty provision, it has therefore not acted in good faith. In
our view, it would be necessary to prove more than mere violation to
support such a conclusion."' 68 This statement seems to embrace a pre-
sumption of good faith on the part of WTO disputants. Applying the
same rationale here would mean that if the EC could reasonably be un-
derstood to have instituted their GSP scheme to convey an economic
benefit, as required by GATT, then they should be held to have done so,
and it is India's responsibility to prove their wrongful intent. Thus, al-
though it is the EC's responsibility to demonstrate that its regulation is
168. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R, T 298 (Jan. 27, 2003).
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WTO-consistent, in this particular case the question of the regulation's
consistency will turn upon an issue that must be demonstrated by India.
Hence, India will bear both the prima facie burden and the ultimate bur-
den, and as argued above, will have difficulty carrying the latter.
CONCLUSION
Developing countries had to fight long and hard for GSP prefer-
ences, and it is clear that they benefit from them greatly. However, if a
benefit is freely given it can become a chain as well as an aid, and that is
the problem with which developing countries are now faced. Unable to
secure the agreement of developed countries to a scheme of mandatory
tariff preferences, or even significant constraints on when voluntary
preferences could be withdrawn, they were forced to settle for a discre-
tionary system that ultimately conveys to developed countries the ability
to influence the domestic policies of developing countries. However,
while this may be a desirable tool when used to help the disempowered,
as is arguably so in the current case, it can, of course, also be abused. As
a result, while it should be a great cause of celebration when the EC's
scheme is upheld as WTO-consistent, this should not serve as a disincen-
tive from closer examination of the GSP system, in order to find a way
that developed countries might best be constrained from using it in ob-
jectionable ways within a WTO system that goes out of its way to avoid
striking down national regulations.
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